Aerosource Inc v. Secretary Transp by unknown
1998 Decisions 
Opinions of the United 
States Court of Appeals 
for the Third Circuit 
4-1-1998 
Aerosource Inc v. Secretary Transp 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998 
Recommended Citation 
"Aerosource Inc v. Secretary Transp" (1998). 1998 Decisions. 63. 
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/thirdcircuit_1998/63 
This decision is brought to you for free and open access by the Opinions of the United States Court of Appeals for 
the Third Circuit at Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository. It has been accepted for 
inclusion in 1998 Decisions by an authorized administrator of Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law 
Digital Repository. 
Filed April 1, 1998 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 
No. 97-3313 
 
AEROSOURCE, INC., 
       Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
RODNEY SLATER, SECRETARY OF THE U.S. 
DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION; BARRY 
VALENTINE, ACTING ADMINISTRATOR OF THE FEDERAL 
AVIATION ADMINISTRATION; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
TRANSPORTATION AND FEDERAL AVIATION 
ADMINISTRATION, 
       Respondents 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order 
of the Federal Aviation Administration 
(AC No. 43-15) 
 
Argued March 9, 1998 
 
BEFORE: GREENBERG, SCIRICA, and ALDISERT, 
Circuit Judges 
 
(Filed: April 1, 1998) 
 
       Louise B. Cobbs (argued) 
       Haight, Gardner, Holland & Knight 
       2000 K Street, N.W. 
       Suite 200 
       Washington, D.C. 20006 
 
        Attorneys for Petitioner 
 
 
  
       Frank W. Hunger 
       Assistant Attorney General 
       Robert S. Greenspan 
       Edward Himmelfarb (argued) 
       Attorneys, Appellate Staff 
       Civil Division, Room 9145 
       Department of Justice 
       601 "D" Street, N.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20530-0001 
 
       David M. Wiegand 
       Mgr. General & Administrative 
       Litigation Branch, AGC-410 
       Office of the Chief Counsel 
       Litigation Division 
       Federal Aviation Administration 
       Washington, D.C. 20591 
 
       James S. Dillman 
       United States Department of 
       Transportation 
       400 7th Street, S.W. 
       Washington, D.C. 20590 
 
        Attorneys for Respondents 
 
OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
This matter is before the court on a petition for review of 
a Federal Aviation Administration ("FAA") action brought by 
Aerosource, Inc., pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 46110(a).1 In the 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Aerosource in its petition for review relies only on 49 U.S.C. S 46110 
as establishing our jurisdiction. In its brief, however, it also cites the 
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. S 702, as a basis for us to 
exercise jurisdiction. We are deciding this case under section 46110(a), 
as the case has been briefed largely under 49 U.S.C. app. S 1486, the 
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alternative, anticipating that we might determine that we do 
not have appellate jurisdiction, Aerosource relies on our 
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus pursuant to the 
All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. S 1651(a), to achieve the relief it 
seeks in its petition for review. 
 
A. Regulatory Framework 
 
We find it useful at the outset to describe the regulatory 
framework in which this dispute has arisen. The 
Administrator of the FAA has a statutory responsibility to 
prescribe regulations and establish minimum standards to 
promote safe civil aircraft flight. See 49 U.S.C. 
S 44701(a)(2). Thus, the Administrator is responsible for 
establishing standards concerning various aspects of the 
inspection and servicing of aircraft and aircraft parts. See 
id. The FAA further is authorized to "examine and rate" 
stations and shops that repair2 aircraft and aircraft parts 
regarding the adequacy and suitability of the stations' 
equipment, facilities, and personnel. See 49 U.S.C. 
S 44707(2). 
 
Pursuant to this statutory mandate, the FAA has 
promulgated regulations governing the issuance of repair 
station certificates, the ratings of such stations, and 
general operating procedures for certified stations. See 14 
C.F.R. Part 145. A station's certificate specifies which types 
of equipment or components the FAA has certified the 
station to repair. This specification is known as a rating. 
See 14 C.F.R. SS 145.11, 145.31. Propellers, radio 
equipment, accessories, landing gear, and engines are 
examples of categories of ratings. A repair station's rating 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
predecessor section to section 46110(a). We note, however that, as we 
explain below, the courts have looked to the Administrative Procedure 
Act in defining the term "order" for purposes of appeal under section 
1486. See infra note 8. Thus, Aerosource's citation of 5 U.S.C. S 702 as 
a basis for our jurisdiction has not enhanced its jurisdictional 
contentions. 
 
2. We use the term "repair" to refer to repair, maintenance, and overhaul 
of aircraft components. Although these terms refer to different 
procedures, the distinction is not relevant to the disposition of this 
case. 
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may be unlimited or limited as to the types of equipment or 
components or a specific model aircraft or engine. See 14 
C.F.R. S 145.33. A repair station may repair any equipment 
or component for which it has been rated. See  14 C.F.R. 
S 145.51. 
 
Stations applying for certification or rating must have 
adequate inspection procedures to ensure quality control 
and qualified inspection personnel. Once certified and rated 
to perform a particular repair, a certified station must have 
a qualified inspector inspect the equipment before it is 
approved for return to service on an aircraft. See 14 C.F.R. 
S 145.59(a). Certified stations have a duty to report defects 
or unairworthiness to the FAA. See 14 C.F.R.S 145.63(a). A 
certified station must allow the FAA to inspect the station 
for compliance with the regulations. See 14 C.F.R. S 145.23. 
 
The FAA is required to publish "all reports, orders, 
decisions and regulations . . . in the form and the way best 
adapted for public use." 49 U.S.C. S 40114(a)(2). Pursuant 
to this authority, the FAA publishes two documents, 
Service Difficulty Reports ("SDRs") and General Aviation 
Airworthiness Alerts ("Alerts"), relevant here. 
 
The Service Difficulty program is an information system 
intended to aid owners, operators, manufacturers, and the 
FAA in identifying problems encountered during aircraft 
service. The FAA receives relevant information from a 
variety of sources, including FAA inspectors, owners, 
operators, and certified repair stations. The FAA requests 
as much information as possible, even "insignificant 
reports," and maintains the information for five years to 
detect trends and failure rates. The FAA publishes a weekly 
summary of the collected service difficulty information in 
SDRs. The publication is distributed to the FAA's Flight 
Standards District Offices and Manufacturing Inspection 
District Offices and is available to the public at no charge. 
 
Alerts contain information intended to assist 
maintenance and inspection personnel in performing their 
duties and provide a channel of communication through 
which the aviation community can exchange service 
experience and thereby improve the reliability, safety, and 
durability of aircraft products. The information in the Alerts 
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is selected from the monthly listing of SDRs on a particular 
product. Alerts primarily are directed toward a particular 
segment of the aviation community, but are circulated 
widely within the FAA. 
 
B. FAA's Investigation of Aerosource 
 
Aerosource is an FAA-certified repair station in Somerset, 
New Jersey. The FAA began an investigation of Aerosource 
in July 1996 which revealed various deficiencies. The 
investigation led to Aerosource and the FAA entering into a 
consent order in August 1996 providing for Aerosource 
voluntarily to surrender its unlimited accessory rating in 
exchange for limited accessory ratings and the FAA's 
promise that it would not unreasonably withhold or delay 
the approval and issuance of additional ratings to 
Aerosource. 
 
Nevertheless, in October 1996, the FAA ceased adding 
parts to Aerosource's ratings because it had safety concerns 
which arose after execution of the consent order. Because 
the FAA did not provide Aerosource with a further 
explanation of its concerns at that time, Aerosource made 
a Freedom of Information Act request for its file. In 
response, the FAA produced a file in early December 1996, 
which revealed that one of Aerosource's customers, 
Raytheon Aerospace Company, had made inquiry of the 
FAA of the state of its investigation of Aerosource. The FAA 
responded to Raytheon by letter dated July 31, 1996, 
stating that the investigation was as yet inconclusive, but 
suggesting that "[i]f either of [two aircraft] parts were 
overhauled for your company by Aerosource, you may want 
to inspect the components for obvious problems and check 
performance." As a result, Raytheon removed several parts 
from stock which Aerosource had overhauled and 
contracted with certain of Aerosource's competitors for 
teardown and inspections of the parts. A teardown is a 
process in which the part is disassembled completely and 
is subjected to a detailed inspection. These repair stations 
performed the teardowns and reported various problems 
with Aerosource's maintenance of the parts. 
 
In December 1996, the FAA circulated an SDR, dated 
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October 1996, which identified specific parts that 
Aerosource had repaired or overhauled improperly. The 
SDR warned the aviation community that Aerosource may 
have maintained other aircraft parts improperly.3 The SDR 
stated that an FAA investigation revealed that some 
components Aerosource had serviced had been returned to 
service notwithstanding their failure to meet manufacturer's 
specifications. In particular, the SDR named two specific 
components which "should be suspected as improperly 
maintained until further evaluations are performed." The 
notice stated that these components may be subject to 
early failure and that Aerosource had a system in place 
which may have resulted in the returning of components to 
service without proper maintenance. The notice 
recommended that anyone who had these particular 
components repaired by Aerosource take appropriate action 
to determine whether they met applicable standards. The 
SDR also requested any additional information that 
recipients of the SDR might have regarding the parts. 
 
In December 1996, the FAA published an Alert which 
repeated the notice from the SDR concerning Aerosource 
virtually verbatim. The Alert, however, included the 
following disclaimer language: "This article is published as 
it was received, except for editorial changes." Both the SDR 
and Alert were based on the reports of the teardowns and 
inspections which Aerosource's competitors performed. 
 
In early January 1997, Aerosource responded to the 
FAA's allegation and on January 9, 1997, met with the FAA 
to discuss the validity of the results of the teardown 
inspections. According to Aerosource, the FAA issued the 
SDR and Alert on the basis of unconfirmed, unwitnessed, 
and unverified conclusions by Aerosource's competitors, 
embodied in the teardown reports. More particularly, 
Aerosource alleges that these competitors made the 
teardown inspections without FAA supervision and under 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The timing of the publication of these notices is in dispute. According 
to Aerosource, the SDR was not published until December although it 
was dated in October. According to the FAA, there is no evidence that 
the SDR was not circulated until December. The discrepancy makes no 
difference to our outcome. 
 
                                6 
  
such circumstances as to render them unreliable. For 
example, one facility performed work for which the FAA had 
not certified it and another facility used a manual outdated 
for at least 12 years in conducting the inspection and used 
repair rather than inspection criteria. 
 
On January 17, 1997, Aerosource wrote a letter to the 
FAA requesting that the FAA retract the notice published in 
the Alert concerning Aerosource. In support of its request, 
Aerosource cited the indications that the teardowns were 
unreliable. While the FAA did not retract the Alert it did 
restore Aerosource's unlimited accessory ratings on 
January 27, 1997, and closed the enforcement investigation 
based upon the teardown reports. 
 
Since that time, the FAA has continued to refuse 
Aerosource's requests to rescind the Alert and the SDR as 
well. In these requests, Aerosource objected to the 
reliability of the information on which the SDR and Alert 
were based. Thus, on February 7, 1997, Aerosource wrote 
to the Director of the FAA's Flight Standards Service asking 
that the FAA issue "a special notice withdrawing an 
inaccurate notice" in the Alert.4 On March 27, 1997, 
Aerosource again wrote to the FAA, this time requesting a 
reconsideration of both the SDR and the Alert. 
 
On March 28, 1997, the FAA denied these requests for 
rescission. The FAA's letter explained that, at the January 
9 meeting, Aerosource presented sufficient information to 
justify the FAA's reexamination of the teardown reports. 
However, after reexamining all of the information collected 
during the investigation, the FAA found that the 
preponderance of the findings in the reports had been 
substantiated. The FAA also explained that Aerosource's 
ratings had been reissued because Aerosource was 
currently in compliance with all applicable regulations. 
 
On April 18, 1997, Aerosource sent a letter to the FAA 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. Having not yet received a response from the FAA, Aerosource wrote a 
similar letter on March 14, 1997, renewing its request for rescission of 
the Alert. Aerosource emphasized that the FAA would have to act 
promptly in order to prevent Aerosource from sustaining additional 
damage to its business. 
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requesting reconsideration of the denial. This letter 
challenged the FAA's explanation contained in its denial 
and made the same arguments as in its original request for 
rescission. The FAA denied this request on May 6, 1997, 
again stating that it based its decision not to rescind the 
notices upon a reexamination of all of the data. Further, 
the FAA explained that the reissuance of Aerosource's 
ratings "is an acknowledgment that, at this time, 
Aerosource meets the Federal Aviation Regulation 
requirements to provide maintenance services to the 
aviation community." 
 
Aerosource then filed a petition with this court seeking 
review of the FAA's May 6, 1997 letter denying Aerosource's 
request to reconsider the FAA's denial of the request for 
rescission of the SDR and Alert.5 Alternatively, Aerosource 
seeks the same relief through the issuance of a writ of 
mandamus. 
 
II. DISCUSSION 
 
A. Review of FAA Action 
 
Pursuant to 49 U.S.C. S 46110(a): 
 
       a person disclosing substantial interest in an order 
       issued by the Secretary of Transportation (or the 
       Administrator of the Federal Aviation Administration 
       with respect to aviation safety duties and powers 
       designated to be carried out by the Administrator) 
       under this part may apply for review of the order by 
       filing a petition for review in the . . . court of appeals 
       of the United States for the circuit in which the person 
       resides or has its principal place of business. 
 
While Aerosource contends that we have jurisdiction under 
this section, the FAA argues that we do not have 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. It appears that Aerosource was not aware that the FAA had issued the 
SDR until on or shortly before March 27, 1997. App. at 491. Thus, it 
had sought only a rescission of the Alert prior to that date. We, however, 
are not distinguishing between the Alert and the SDR in our disposition 
of this case. 
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jurisdiction to review the FAA action because the FAA has 
not issued an order within the meaning of this section.6 We 
are exercising plenary review on this point as we decide the 
issue through the application of legal principles. 
 
We have not yet determined what constitutes an "order" 
within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. S 46110(a). In fact, few 
courts have addressed this statute,7 although many have 
interpreted its predecessor, 49 U.S.C. app. S 1486, which 
provided that: 
 
       [a]ny order, affirmative or negative, issued by the Board 
       or Secretary of Transportation under this chapter . . . 
       shall be subject to review by the courts of appeals of 
       the United States or the United States Court of Appeals 
       for the District of Columbia, upon petition, filed within 
       sixty days after the entry of such order, by any person 
       disclosing a substantial interest in such order. 
 
Courts uniformly imposed judicial limitations on section 
1486, holding that it applied only to "final orders" of the 
FAA. See, e.g., Mace v. Skinner , 34 F.3d 854, 857 (9th Cir. 
1994); Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d 514, 519 (11th Cir. 
1993); Atorie Air, Inc. v. FAA, 942 F.2d 954, 960 (5th Cir. 
1991); Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n v. FAA, 881 
F.2d 672, 675 (9th Cir. 1989); Red River Transp. & Dev., 
Co. v. FAA, 630 F.2d 592, 594 (8th Cir. 1980).8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. The FAA does not deny that Aerosource filed its petition for review in 
the correct circuit and that it has disclosed a sufficiently substantial 
interest to maintain these proceedings. 
 
7. The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit is apparently the only court 
of appeals which has addressed this section, but the holding of this case 
is not relevant here. See Tur v. FAA, 104 F.3d 290 (9th Cir. 1997) 
(holding that the district court lacked jurisdiction to entertain a claim 
for 
rescission of an order because the statute vests exclusive jurisdiction 
for 
such claims in the court of appeals). 
 
8. In interpreting the term "order" as used in this section, some courts 
have looked to the use of the term in the Administrative Procedure Act. 
See, e.g., Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n, 881 F.2d at 675. The 
APA broadly defines "order" as "the whole or part of a final disposition 
. . . of an agency in a matter other than rulemaking. . . ." 5 U.S.C. 
S 551(6). 
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Thus, courts have held that the term "order" in section 
1486 "applies to an[y] agency decision which imposes an 
obligation, denies a right, or fixes some legal relationship" 
and which is final. Mace, 34 F.3d at 857 (internal quotation 
marks omitted); see also Atorie Air, Inc., 942 F.2d at 960; 
Shea v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 934 F.2d 41, 44-45 (3d 
Cir. 1991) (using the same language to describefinal 
agency actions). 
 
In determining what constitutes a final FAA order under 
section 1486, the courts have found that the "order" need 
not be formal. Thus, letters and other communications can 
be final orders depending upon the surrounding 
circumstances and other indicia of finality. Compare Tur v. 
FAA, 104 F.3d 290 (holding that a consent decree was an 
"order" within the meaning of section 46110(a)); Air One 
Helicopters, Inc. v. FAA, 86 F.3d 880 (9th Cir. 1996) 
(holding that an FAA opinion letter was a reviewable order 
because administrative remedies were futile); Kemmons 
Wilson, Inc. v. FAA, 882 F.2d 1041 (6th Cir. 1989) (FAA 
letter was final order), with Blincoe v. FAA, 37 F.3d 462 (9th 
Cir. 1994) (letter not final order where by its terms the 
letter suggested that the administrative process was 
incomplete); Air California v. United States Dep't of Transp., 
654 F.2d 616 (9th Cir. 1981) (letter warning of impending 
action not final); Red River Transp. & Dev., Co. v. FAA, 630 
F.2d 592 (tentative language of FAA letter rendered it not 
final). Similarly, to be final for purposes of review, the 
"order" need not be the product of formal agency decision 
making, see Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n, 881 
F.2d at 675; Sima Prods. Corp v. McLucas, 612 F.2d 309, 
312 (7th Cir. 1980), and "orders" are reviewable under 
section 1486 even though the administrator of the FAA has 
not issued them, see Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' 
Ass'n, 881 F.2d at 675. In addition, it has been held that 
to be appealable, the "order" must be predicated on an 
administrative record sufficient to allow a court to engage 
in a meaningful review of the order. See Atorie Air, Inc., 942 
F.2d at 960; Green v. Brantley, 981 F.2d at 519; Sierra Club 
v. Skinner, 885 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1989). 
 
We have not addressed the proper limits to "order" as 
used in section 1486, and therefore have not had the 
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occasion to decide whether to accept the limitations on 
what constitutes an order which other courts universally 
have imposed. Yet, given the similarity between section 
1486 and its successor, section 46110(a), there seems to be 
no reason why the judicial limitations should not apply 
equally to section 46110(a), the current version of the 
statute.9 Moreover, the parties do not argue that this court 
should interpret the term "order" differently than have 
other courts of appeals. Thus, we conclude that to be 
reviewable under section 46110(a), an "order" must be final, 
but need not be a formal order, the product of a formal 
decision-making process, or be issued personally by the 
Administrator. Of course, it also must impose an obligation, 
deny a right, or fix some legal relationship. 10 
 
There are three FAA actions relevant in determining 
whether Aerosource's petition seeks to review an order and 
thus whether we have jurisdiction: (1) the issuance of the 
SDR and Alert; (2) the March 28, 1997 letter refusing to 
rescind the SDR and Alert; and (3) the May 6, 1997  letter 
refusing to reconsider its decision not to rescind the SDR 
and Alert. As discussed above, a finding that these actions, 
or any one of them, is final is not precluded by their lack 
of formality, see Tur, 104 F.2d at 292; Air One, 86 F.3d at 
882, the lack of a formal hearing in this case, see, e.g., 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
9. The parties do not argue this point in their briefs to this court. 
Rather, 
they cite the cases dealing with section 1486 as though they were 
decided under section 46110 without acknowledging the change in 
statutory language. Thus, they silently assume that we likewise would 
impose a finality requirement. 
 
10. We are not predicating our ruling on a possible insufficiency of the 
administrative record, as we find the record sufficient for us to make a 
meaningful review. In fact, we make that review in considering 
Aerosource's application for mandamus relief. In this regard, we point 
out that an agency action not predicated on an administrative record 
permitting meaningful review could impose substantial obligations on a 
petitioner who thus reasonably could contend that it is entitled to review 
without regard for the state of the record. We observe that while the 
courts recite that an appealable order must be based on a record 
sufficient to permit a meaningful review, they regularly find the record 
adequate for that purpose. We leave to another day the determination of 
whether, and if so how, a court would exercise appellate jurisdiction 
notwithstanding an inadequate record for the review. 
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Southern Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n, 881 F.2d at 675, or 
the fact that the Administrator did not personally issue the 
letters, see id. Thus, the focus of our inquiry is on whether 
one of these actions had the type of effect required of a 
"final" agency action. 
 
In determining whether there is a final agency action, the 
Supreme Court has stated that the "core question is 
whether the agency has completed its decision making 
process, and whether the result of that process is one that 
will directly affect the parties." Franklin v. Massachusetts, 
505 U.S. 788, 797, 112 S.Ct. 2767, 2773 (1992). The action 
must be a "definitive statement[ ] of [the agency's] position" 
with concrete legal consequences. See FTC v. Standard Oil 
Co., 449 U.S. 232, 241, 101 S.Ct. 488, 493 (1980) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
In Standard Oil, the Supreme Court held that the Federal 
Trade Commission's ("FTC") issuance of a complaint was 
not a final agency action and therefore was not reviewable 
under the Administrative Procedure Act. See Standard Oil, 
449 U.S. at 238, 101 S.Ct. at 492. The Court reasoned that 
the complaint was, by its terms, not a definitive statement; 
rather, the complaint was only indicative of the FTC's 
"reason to believe" that the party was violating the law. See 
id. at 241, 101 S.Ct. 493-94. The Court found that the 
complaint did not have the legal force or practical effect on 
the party's daily business activities indicative of a final 
agency determination. See id. at 242, 101 S.Ct. at 494. The 
Court recognized that the complaint imposed the 
substantial burden of responding to the allegations, but 
noted that this was "different in kind and legal effect from 
the burdens attending what heretofore has been considered 
final agency action." See id. at 242, 101 S.Ct. at 494. The 
Court noted that this burden is the same as that 
accompanying any major litigation, but not the same type 
of effect as requiring a company to change its daily 
operations and expend resources investing in new 
equipment. See id. 
 
The Standard Oil Court also rejected the argument that 
the petitioner's request of the Commission to reconsider the 
issuance of the complaint somehow rendered it a definitive 
agency action. See id. at 243, 101 S.Ct. at 495. The Court 
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recognized that such a request, and the Commission's 
subsequent denial of it, likely exhausted petitioner's 
administrative remedy with regard to whether the 
Commission had the required "reason to believe" that the 
petitioner was violating the law. See id. But the Court held 
that the issuance of a complaint is a step toward, and 
ultimately will merge into, the Commission's decision as to 
whether the party violated federal law. See id. at 246, 101 
S.Ct. at 497. 
 
We have applied a factored analysis to determine whether 
an agency's action is final. See In re Seidman, 37 F.3d 911, 
923 (3d Cir. 1994). An order's finality is "informed but not 
decided by an agency classification" and is characterized by 
the following five factors: 
 
       (1) whether the decision represents the agency's 
       definitive position on the question; (2) whether  the 
       decision has the status of law with the expectation of 
       immediate compliance; (3) whether the decision has 
       immediate impact on the day-to-day operations of the 
       party seeking review; (4) whether the decision inv olves 
       a pure question of law that does not require further 
       factual development; and (5) whether immediate rev iew 
       would speed enforcement of the relevant act. 
 
Id. at 923 (quoting CEC Energy Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n, 
891 F.2d 1107, 1101 (3d Cir. 1989)). This formulation is in 
accord with the Supreme Court's conclusion that the 
following are indicia of finality in the context of other 
agencies' actions: a definitive statement of the agency's 
position which has a direct and immediate effect on the 
petitioner's day-to-day operations, which has the status of 
law, and of which immediate compliance is expected. See 
Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 239, 101 S.Ct. at 493. 
 
As noted above, considering the SDR and the Alert 
together, there are three FAA actions which might be 
treated as orders subject to review. Aerosource contends 
that the May 6 letter was a final order reviewable under 49 
U.S.C. S 46110(a) and thus its petition seeks review of that 
letter. Yet we also must consider the finality of the SDR and 
the Alert and the March 28 letter, as the finality of the May 
6 letter depends on the finality for purposes of review of 
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these earlier documents. After all, if a court treated the 
denial of an application to reconsider an action which is not 
in itself a final order as a final order, then a petitioner 
simply by asking for reconsideration could convert a 
nonfinal action into a final order. Of course, this conversion 
should not be permitted. See Standard Oil, 449 U.S. at 243, 
101 S.Ct. at 495 ("But the Commission's refusal to 
reconsider its issuance of the complaint does not render the 
complaint a `definitive' action.").11 Accordingly, the FAA 
primarily alleges that neither the March 28, 1997 letter nor 
the May 6, 1997 letter can be a final order unless the SDR 
and Alert are themselves final. We discuss each of these 
FAA actions with respect to their finality. 
 
1. SDR and Alert 
 
We agree with the FAA that the SDR and Alert were not 
final orders because their conclusions were tentative and 
indicative of an on-going investigation. Thus, they are like 
the complaint issued in Standard Oil, which the Supreme 
Court found was not a final, reviewable order. Indeed, it is 
impossible to characterize either the SDR or the Alert as 
announcing, as set forth in Seidman, the FAA's definitive 
statement, as both publications merely gave advisory 
information predicated on information supplied to the FAA. 
 
The SDR and the Alert were similar to a letter of which 
a petitioner in the Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit 
sought review in Red River Transport & Dev., Co., 630 F.2d 
592. There, the court held that the letter was not a final 
order as it merely notified the petitioner of an on-going 
investigation and requested the petitioner to submit any 
evidence which it cared to offer in regard to the 
investigation. In addition, by its terms, the letter in Red 
River did not make any final conclusions or decisions; 
rather, it stated that "[i]f the facts as stated are correct, it 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
11. We are not implying that in no circumstance could a denial of a 
request for reconsideration of some action which, in itself, was not a 
final order not be a final order subject to judicial review. Obviously, we 
are only ruling on the situation before us. Conceivably the denial of the 
reconsideration could have consequences going beyond the underlying 
action. But this situation is not present here. 
 
                                14 
  
appears that there may have been a violation" of federal 
regulations and "[s]hould this investigation substantiate 
that a violation did or did not occur, you will be informed 
accordingly." Id. at 593-94. 
 
The SDR and Alert were also, by their terms, tentative. 
The notices stated that certain components were suspected 
as being improperly serviced by Aerosource and requested 
any additional information which their recipients could 
produce. But the SDR and the Alert were nothing more 
than what their names implied, for they were advisory in 
nature. They imposed no obligations, denied no right, and 
did not fix or alter a legal relationship. Indeed, the Alert 
recited that the information it contained was significant but 
not "evaluated fully by the time the material went to press." 
Thus, neither the SDR nor the Alert had the force of law. 
 
2. March 28, 1977 Letter 
 
The FAA issued a letter on March 28, 1997, denying 
Aerosource's request to rescind the Alert and SDR. 12 In that 
letter, the FAA summarized the course of the investigation, 
including the source of the information in the SDR and 
Alert and the FAA's meeting with Aerosource resulting in 
the FAA's reexamination of the data on which the SDR and 
Alert were based. The FAA then stated that: 
 
       [w]e have completed our reexamination of all the data 
       that has come to our attention during this 
       investigation. This includes an analysis of the tear- 
       down reports . . . . After compilation and review of all 
       of the results, we found that a preponderance of those 
       original findings has been substantiated. 
 
       We understand Aerosource's concern because of our 
       publication of the Alert and SDR. However, in the 
       interest of aviation safety, and our duty to safeguard 
       the flying public, we have no recourse but to allow the 
       FAA Alert and SDR to stand as published. 
 
App. at 494-95. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
12. The FAA, but not Aerosource, characterizes the letter as acting on a 
request for reconsideration. 
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This letter evinces the FAA's intent not to rescind the 
SDR and Alert and establishes that the FAA found that the 
information in the SDR and Alert was not unfounded. 
Nevertheless, it did not impose an obligation, deny a right, 
or fix some legal relationship. The only thing denied in this 
letter is the "right" to the rescission of the publications. The 
letter did not require Aerosource to do anything, and there 
is nothing in the letter with which Aerosource is expected 
to comply. Indeed, the letter did nothing more than leave 
Aerosource in the position it was in after the SDR and Alert 
were issued. 
 
3. May 6, 1977 letter 
 
After the FAA denied Aerosource's request to rescind, 
Aerosource sent another letter to the FAA on April 18, 
1997, urging the FAA to reconsider its decision. The FAA 
responded by letter of May 6, 1997, denying Aerosource's 
request to reconsider the FAA's decision not to rescind the 
Alert. In so denying, the FAA stated that "[o]ur decision not 
to withdraw the Alert was based upon a reexamination of 
all the data that came to our attention during the 
investigation." Aerosource argues that the FAA's May 6 
letter refusing to rescind the SDR and Alerts was a final 
order which we may review under 49 U.S.C. S 46110. In so 
arguing, Aerosource cites excerpts from the FAA's various 
correspondences with Aerosource, and states that"[t]hese 
letters make clear that the FAA has reached afinal 
reviewable decision." Br. at 20 n.10 (emphasis added). 
Aerosource's arguments treat the March 28 letter as 
merging into the May 6 letter. 
 
It is clear that this May 6 letter represents the FAA's final 
position on the issue of whether it will rescind the SDR and 
the Alert. However, this letter does not anticipate that 
Aerosource will comply with any directive, as the letter sets 
forth nothing with which it must comply. Thus, the May 6 
letter no more imposed legal obligations, fixed rights, or 
altered a legal relationship than did the March 28, 1997 
letter or the SDR or the Alert themselves. At bottom, 
therefore, this case concerns nothing more than the 
issuance of advisory warnings and the FAA's refusal to 
withdraw the warnings predicated on its conclusion that it 
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properly had issued them. Neither Aerosource nor any 
other entity suffered any legal consequences as a result of 
the issuance of the SDR or the Alert or from the sending of 
the letters. 
 
We, of course, recognize the severe adverse impact the 
SDR and the Alert had on Aerosource's business. It is quite 
natural that in the sophisticated market for aircraft parts 
repair services the customers would be aware of and 
mindful of an SDR and an Alert and would take the 
information in such documents into account when seeking 
repair services. Undoubtedly Aerosource's customers did 
exactly that. Nevertheless, we have concluded that in view 
of all the circumstances of this case none of the documents 
at issue here can be regarded as a reviewable order. 
Moreover, contrary to Aerosource's contention, the fact that 
the FAA's actions were directed at a single company rather 
than at the industry at large does not affect our result as 
none of the materials has the indicia of an order. 
Furthermore, we see no reason why a mandatory direction 
to an entire industry could not be an order. Thus, we will 
not create a criterion for an FAA action to be an order that 
it affect only a single company. Nor will we hold that an 
action affecting a single company necessarily is an order. 
Thus, we reject Aerosource's contention that the FAA has 
de facto decertified it, thus entering an order against it. 
 
In reaching our result, we quite naturally consider our 
recent decision in Hindes v. FDIC, 1998 WL 65978 (3d Cir. 
Feb. 19, 1998). In Hindes, the FDIC notified the Meritor 
Savings Bank that unless Meritor satisfied certain 
capitalization requirements the FDIC would cancel its 
deposit insurance. The demand created a crisis which led 
the Pennsylvania Secretary of Banking to close the bank 
and appoint the FDIC as its receiver on the same day that 
the FDIC notified Meritor of its capitalization requirements. 
 
The impact of the FDIC's notice on Meritor was dramatic. 
Nevertheless, we held that the Notification was not a final 
agency action for purposes of APA review. We pointed out 
that the Notification was not the FDIC's definitive 
statement, did not impose an obligation, deny a right, or fix 
a legal relationship. Rather, the Notification was merely the 
first step of a multi-step statutory procedure which could 
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lead to the termination of the institution's deposit 
insurance. Id. at *11-*12. Thus, we concluded that the 
district court did not have jurisdiction to review the 
Notification. Id. 
 
We recognize that the language of the APA in 5 U.S.C. 
S 702 differs from that in section 46110(a). Yet similar 
principles apply under both statutes. See, e.g., Southern 
Cal. Aerial Advertisers' Ass'n, 881 F.2d at 675. Moreover, 
on the facts in Hindes, an arguably even stronger case for 
judicial review could be made than has been made here. 
After all, in Hindes, the Notification required Meritor to take 
action, failing which the FDIC would initiate an 
administrative proceeding.13 Indeed, the impact of the 
Notification on Meritor reasonably may be characterized as 
more severe than the impact on Aerosource of the SDR and 
the Alert. Yet in Hindes we held that the district court did 
not have jurisdiction to review the issuance of the 
Notification because, inter alia, "it was not a final agency 
action." Id. at *11.14 
 
B. Mandamus 
 
As we have indicated, Aerosource contends that 
alternatively we have jurisdiction to issue a writ of 
mandamus pursuant to the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 
S 1651(a). Thus, it requests that if we conclude that we do 
not have jurisdiction pursuant to its petition for review, we 
treat the petition as seeking a writ of mandamus and that 
through this device we compel the FAA to rescind the SDR 
and Alert. Mandamus is only appropriate where the 
petitioner can establish that it has no alternative, adequate 
remedy and that its right to the writ is clear and 
indisputable. See Rhoune-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 32 F.3d 851, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
13. The Secretary of Banking's action obviated the need for the 
administrative proceeding. 
 
14. The FAA, relying on ICC v. Brotherhood of Locomotive Eng'rs, 482 
U.S. 270, 107 S.Ct. 2360 (1987), contends that the petition for review 
which Aerosource filed on June 9, 1997, was not timely as it could have 
been timely only if measured from May 6, 1997, when the second letter 
at issue here is dated. In view of our result, we have no need to reach 
this argument and to spell out its nuances. 
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861 (3d Cir. 1994). In addition, the petitioner generally 
must show irreparable injury caused by the error. See 
United States v. Wexler, 31 F.3d 117, 128 (3d Cir. 1994). 
We have reviewed Aerosource's mandamus argument 
carefully and find that while it has no adequate alternative 
remedy and that its injury has been severe, nevertheless on 
the facts its right to the writ is not clear and indisputable. 
Consequently, we are constrained to deny Aerosource's 
petition insofar as it seeks mandamus. 
 
III. CONCLUSION 
 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is 
dismissed and, treating the petition as seeking a writ of 
mandamus, mandamus is denied. 
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